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This paper summarizes a new database that sheds light on the impact of trade-related policy 
developments over the past half century on distortions to agricultural incentives and thus also 
to consumer prices for food in 75 countries spanning the per capita income spectrum. Price-
support policies of advanced economies hurt not only domestic consumers and exporters of 
other products but also foreign producers and traders of farm products, and they reduce 
national and global economic welfare. On the other hand, the governments of many 
developing countries have directly taxed their farmers over the past half-century, both 
directly (e.g., export taxes) and also indirectly via overvaluing their currency and restricting 
imports of manufactures. Thus the price incentives facing farmers in many developing 
countries have been depressed by both own-country and other countries’ agricultural price 
and international trade policies. We summarize these and realted stylized facts that can be 
drawn from a new World Bank database that is worthy of the attention of political economy 
theorists, historians and econometricians. These indicators can be helpful in addressing such 
questions as the following: Where is there still a policy bias against agricultural production? 
To what extent has there been overshooting in the sense that some developing-country food 
producers are now being protected from import competition along the lines of the examples 
of earlier-industrializing Europe and Japan? What are the political economy forces behind the 
more-successful reformers, and how do they compare with those in less-successful countries 
where major distortions in agricultural incentives remain? And what explains the pattern of 
distortions across not only countries but also industries and in the choice of support or tax 
instruments within the agricultural sector of each country?  
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Among the most important influences on the long-run economic growth and distribution of 
global welfare are trade-related policy developments in individual countries and their 
combined effect on other countries via the terms of trade in international markets.
1
For advanced economies the most commonly articulated reason for farm trade 
restrictions has been to protect domestic producers from import competition as they come 
under competitive pressure to shed labor as the economy grows. But in the process those 
protective measures hurt not only domestic consumers and exporters of other products but 
also foreign producers and traders of farm products, and they reduce national and global 
economic welfare. For decades agricultural protection and subsidies in high-income (and 
some middle-income) countries have been depressing international prices of farm products, 
which lowers the earnings of farmers and associated rural businesses in developing countries. 
 Some of 
the policy developments of the past half century have happened quite suddenly and been 
transformational. They include the end of colonization around 1960, the creation of the 
Common Agricultural Policy in Europe in 1962, the floating of exchange rates and associated 
liberalization, deregulation, privatization and democratization in the mid-1980s in many 
countries, and the opening of China in 1979, Vietnam in 1986, and Eastern Europe following 
the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991. Less 
newsworthy and hence less noticed are the influences of policies that change only gradually 
in the course of economic development as comparative advantages evolve. This chapter is 
focused on summarizing a new database that sheds light on the combined impact of trade-
related policy developments over the past half century on distortions to agricultural incentives 
and thus also to consumer prices for food.  
                                                 
1 See, for example, Anderson and Winters (2009) and the literature surveyed therein.   
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The Haberler (1958) report to GATT Contracting Parties forewarned that such distortions 
might worsen, and indeed they did between the 1950s and the early 1980s (Anderson, 
Hayami and Others 1986), thereby adding to global inequality and poverty because three-
quarters of the world’s poorest people depend directly or indirectly on agriculture for their 
main income (World Bank 2007).  
In addition to this external policy influence on rural poverty, the governments of 
many developing countries have directly taxed their farmers over the past half-century. A 
well-known example is the taxing of exports of plantation crops in post-colonial Africa 
(Bates 1981). At the same time, many developing countries chose also to overvalue their 
currency, and to pursue an import-substituting industrialization strategy by restricting imports 
of manufactures. Together those measures indirectly taxed producers of other tradable 
products in developing economies, by far the most numerous of them being farmers 
(Krueger, Schiff and Valdés 1988, 1991). Thus the price incentives facing farmers in many 
developing countries have been depressed by both own-country and other countries’ 
agricultural price and international trade policies. 
This disarray in world agriculture, as D. Gale Johnson (1973) described it in the title 
of his seminal book, means there has been over-production of farm products in high-income 
countries and under-production in low-income countries. It also means there has been less 
international trade in farm products than would be the case under free trade, thereby thinning 
markets for these weather-dependent products and thus making them more volatile. Using a 
stochastic model of world food markets, Tyers and Anderson (1992, Table 6.14) found that 
instability of international food prices in the early 1980s was three times greater than it would 
have been under free trade in those products. During the past 25 years, however, numerous 
countries have begun to reform their agricultural price and trade policies. That has raised the 
extent to which farm products are traded internationally, but not nearly as fast as 
globalization has proceeded in the non-farm sectors of the world’s economies.
2
To what extent have reforms of the past two decades reversed the above-mentioned 
policy developments of the previous three decades? Empirical indicators of agricultural price 
distortions (called Producer Support and Consumer Subsidy Estimates or PSEs and CSEs) 
have been provided in a consistent way for 20 years by the Secretariat of the OECD (2008) 
for its 30 member countries. However, there are no comprehensive time series rates of 
  
                                                 
2 In the two decades to 2000-04, the value of global exports as a share of GDP rose from 19 to 26 percent, even 
though most of GDP is nontradable governmental and other services, while the share of primary agricultural 
production exported globally, including intra-European Union trade, rose from only 13 percent to just 16 percent 
(World Bank 2007 and FAO 2007, as summarized in Sandri, Valenzuela and Anderson 2007).  
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assistance to producers of nonagricultural goods to compare with the PSEs, nor do they tell us 
what happened in those advanced economies in earlier decades – which are of more 
immediate relevance if we are to see how the two groups of countries’ policies developed 
during similar stages of development. As for developing countries, almost no comparable 
time series estimates have been generated since the Krueger, Schiff and Valdes (1988) study, 
which covered the 1960-1984 period for just 17 developing countries.
3
The purpose of this chapter is to summarize the stylized facts that can be drawn from 
the Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) compilation that are worthy of the attention of political 
economy theorists, historians and econometricians. These indicators can be helpful in 
addressing such questions as the following: Where is there still a policy bias against 
agricultural production? To what extent has there been overshooting in the sense that some 
developing-country food producers are now being protected from import competition along 
the lines of the examples of earlier-industrializing Europe and Japan? What are the political 
economy forces behind the more-successful reformers, and how do they compare with those 
in less-successful countries where major distortions in agricultural incentives remain? Over 
the past two decades, how important have domestic political forces been in bringing about 
reform relative to international forces (such as loan conditionality, rounds of multilateral 
trade negotiations within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, regional integration 
agreements, accession to the World Trade Organization, and the globalization of 
supermarkets and other firms along the value chain) and compared with forces operating in 
earlier decades? What explains the pattern of distortions across not only countries but also 
 An exception is a new 
set of estimates of nominal rates of protection for key farm products in China, India, 
Indonesia and Vietnam since 1985 (Orden et al. 2007). The OECD (2009) also has released 
PSEs for Brazil, China and South Africa as well as several more East European countries. 
The World Bank’s new Database of Agricultural Distortions (Anderson and Valenzuela 
2008) complements and extends those two institutions’ efforts and the seminal Krueger, 
Schiff and Valdés (1988, 1991) study. It builds on them by providing similar estimates for 
other significant (including many low-income) developing economies, by developing and 
estimating new, more comprehensive policy indicators, and by providing estimates of NRAs 
for non-agricultural tradables.  
                                                 
3 A nine-year update for the Latin American countries in the Krueger, Schiff and Valdés sample by the same 
country authors, and a comparable study of seven central and eastern European countries, contain estimates at 
least of direct agricultural distortions (see Valdés 1996, 2000). The Krueger, Schiff and Valdés (1991) chapters 
on Ghana and Sri Lanka have protection estimates back to 1955, as does the study by Anderson, Hayami and 
Others (1986) for Korea and Taiwan (and Japan, and much earlier in the case of rice).   
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industries and in the choice of support or tax instruments within the agricultural sector of 
each country? What policy lessons may be drawn from these differing experiences with a 
view to ensuring better growth-enhancing and poverty-reducing outcomes—including less 
overshooting that results in protectionist regimes—in still-distorted economies during their 
reforms in the future? 
   The new database includes estimates for 75 countries that together account for 
between 90 and 96 percent of the world’s population, farmers, agricultural GDP and total 
GDP (table 1). The sample countries also account for more than 85 percent of farm 
production and employment in each of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the transition 
economies of Europe and Central Asia, and their spectrum of per capita incomes ranges from 
the poorest (Zimbabwe and Ethiopia) to among the richest (Norway).
4 Nominal rates of 
assistance and consumer tax equivalents (NRAs and CTEs) are estimated for more than 70 
different products, with an average of almost a dozen per country. In aggregate the coverage 
represents around 70 percent of the gross value of agricultural production in the focus 
countries,
5 and just under two-thirds of global farm production valued at undistorted prices 
over the period covered. Not all countries had data for the entire 1955-2007 period, but the 
average number of years covered is 41 per country.
6
                                                 
4 See Appendix for more coverage details. The only countries not well represented in the sample are those in the 
Middle East and the many small ones, but in total the omitted countries account for less than 4 percent of the 
global economy (made up of 0.2 percent from each of Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, 0.9 percent from Latin 
America, and the rest from the Middle East and North Africa). 
 Of the world’s 30 most valuable 
agricultural products, the NRAs cover 77 percent of global output, ranging from two-thirds 
for livestock, three-quarters for oilseeds and tropical crops, and five-sixths for grains and 
tubers. Those products represent an even higher share (85 percent) of global agricultural 
exports (see Appendix for details). Having such a comprehensive coverage of countries, 
products and years offers the prospect of obtaining a reliable picture of both long-term trends 
in policies, and annual fluctuations around those trends, for individual countries and 
commodities as well as for country groups, regions, and the world as a whole.  
5 Had seven key mostly-nontraded food staples (bananas, cassava, millet, plantain, potato, sweet potato and 
yam) been included for all instead of just some developing countries, their product coverage would have risen 
from around 70 to 76 percent; and had those staples had an average NRA of zero, they would have brought the 
weighted average NRA for all covered agriculture in developing countries only about half of one percentage 
point closer to zero each decade over the sample period (Anderson 2009, Table 12.10). 
6 By way of comparison, the seminal multi-country study of agricultural pricing policy by Krueger, Schiff and 
Valdes (1988, 1991) covered an average of 23 years to the mid-1980s for its 18 focus countries that accounted 
for 5-6 percent of the global agricultural output; and the producer and consumer support estimates of the OECD 
(2008) cover 22 years for its 30 countries that account for just over one-quarter of the world’s agricultural 
output valued at undistorted prices.  
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This chapter begins with a brief history of agricultural policy developments in outline 
of the methodology used to generate annual indicators of the extent of government 
interventions in markets, details of which are provided in Anderson et al. (2008). A selection 
of stylized facts that can be gleaned from the distortions database is then summarized across 
products, sectors, regions and over the decades since the mid-1950s.
7
 
 The chapter concludes 
with a list of political economy questions needing to be addressed, many of which are the 
subject of subsequent chapters in this volume.  
 





The present study’s methodology focuses mainly on government-imposed distortions that 
create a gap between domestic prices and what they would be under free markets. Since it is 
not possible to understand the characteristics of agricultural development with a sectoral view 
alone, not only are the effects of direct agricultural policy measures (including distortions in 
the foreign exchange market) examined, but also those of distortions in non-agricultural 
tradable sectors.  
Specifically, the Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA) for each farm product is 
computed as the percentage by which government policies have raised gross returns to 
farmers above what they would be without the government’s intervention (or lowered them, 
if NRA<0). Included are any product-specific input subsidies. A weighted average NRA for 
all covered products is derived using the value of production at undistorted prices as product 
weights (unlike the PSEs and CSEs computed by OECD (2008) which are expressed as a 
percentage of the distorted price). To that NRA for covered products is added a ‘guesstimate’ 
of the NRA for non-covered products (on average around 30 pecent of the total) and an 
estimate of the NRA from non-product-specific forms of assistance or taxation. Since the 
1980s some high-income governments have also provided so-called ‘decoupled’ assistance to 
farmers but, because that support in principle does not distort resource allocation, its NRA 
has been computed separately and is not included for direct comparison with the NRAs for 
                                                 
7 These estimates and associated analytical narratives are discussed in far more detail in a global overview 
volume (Anderson 2009), and the detailed developing country case studies are reported in four regional volumes 
covering Africa (Anderson and Masters 2009), Asia (Anderson and Martin 2009a), Latin America (Anderson 
and Valdés 2008) and Europe’s transition economies (Anderson and Swinnen 2008). 
8 Only a brief summary of the methodology is provided here. For details see Anderson et al. (2008) or Appendix 
A in Anderson (2009).  
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other sectors or for developing countries. Each farm industry is classified either as import-
competing, or a producer of exportables, or as producing a nontradable (with its status 
sometimes changing over the years), so as to generate for each year the weighted average 
NRAs for the two different groups of covered tradable farm products. We also generate a 
production-weighted average NRA for nonagricultural tradables, for comparison with that for 







t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the 
agricultural (including non-covered) and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.
9
This approach is not well suited to analysis of the policies of Europe’s or Asia’s 
former socialist economies prior to their reform era, because prices then played only an 
accounting function and currency exchange rates were enormously distorted. During their 
reform era, however, the price comparison approach provides as valuable a set of indicators 
for them as for other market economies of distortions to incentives for farm production, 
consumption and trade, and of the income transfers associated with interventions.
 Since the 
NRA cannot be less than -100 percent if producers are to earn anything, neither can the RRA 
(since the weighted average NRAnonag
t is non-negative in all our country case studies). And 
if both of those sectors are equally assisted, the RRA is zero. This measure is useful in that if 
it is below (above) zero, it provides an internationally comparable indication of the extent to 
which a country’s sectoral policy regime has an anti- (pro-)agricultural bias.  
10
In addition to the mean NRA, a measure of the dispersion or variability of the NRA 
estimates across the covered farm products also is generated for each economy. The cost of 
government policy distortions to incentives in terms of resource misallocation tend to be 
greater the greater the degree of substitution in production. In the case of agriculture which 
involves the use of farm land that is sector-specific but transferable among farm activities, the 
greater the variation of NRAs across industries within the sector then the higher will be the 
welfare cost of those market interventions. A simple indicator of dispersion is the standard 
deviation of the covered industries’ NRAs.  
  
                                                 
9 Farmers are affected not just by prices of their own products but also by the incentives nonagricultural 
producers face. That is, it is relative prices and hence relative rates of government assistance that affect 
producer incentives. More than seventy years ago Lerner (1936) provided his Symmetry Theorem that proved 
that in a two-sector economy, an import tax has the same effect as an export tax. This carries over to a model 
that also includes a third sector producing only nontradables. 
10 Data availability also affects the year from which NRAs can be computed. For Europe’s transition economies 
that starting date is 1992 (2000 for Kazahkstan), for Vietnam it is 1986 and for China it is 1981.  
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Anderson and Neary (2005) show that it is possible to develop a single index that 
captures the extent to which the mean and standard deviation of protection together 
contribute to the welfare cost of distortionary policies. That index recognizes that the welfare 
cost of a government-imposed price distortion is related to the square of the price wedge, and 
so is larger than the mean and is positive regardless of whether the government’s agricultural 
policy is favoring or hurting farmers. In the case where it is only import restrictions that are 
distorting agricultural prices, the index provides a percentage tariff equivalent which, if 
applied uniformly to all imports, would generate the same welfare cost as the actual intra-
sectoral structure of protection from import competition. Lloyd, Croser and Anderson (2009) 
show that, once NRAs and CTEs have been calculated, they can be used to generate such an 
index even in the more complex situation where there may be domestic producer or consumer 
taxes or subsidies in addition to not only import tariffs but any other trade taxes or subsidies 
or quantitative restrictions. They call it a Welfare Reduction Index (WRI). Such a measure is 
the percentage agricultural trade tax (or uniform NRA and CTE) which, if applied equally to 
all agricultural tradables, would generate the same reduction in national economic welfare as 
the actual intra-sectoral structure of distortions to domestic prices of tradable farm goods. 
They also show that, if one is willing to assume that domestic price elasticities of supply 
(demand) are equal across farm commodities, then the only information needed to estimate 
the WRI, in addition to the NRAs and CTEs, is the share of each commodity in the domestic 
value of farm production (consumption) at undistorted prices. 
  While most of the focus is on agricultural producers, we also consider the extent to 
which consumers are taxed or subsidized. To do so, we calculate a Consumer Tax Equivalent 
(CTE) by comparing the price that consumers pay for their food and the international price of 
each food product at the border. Differences between the NRA and the CTE arise from 
distortions in the domestic economy that are caused by transfer policies and taxes/subsidies 
that cause the prices paid by consumers (adjusted to the farmgate level) to differ from those 
received by producers. In the absence of any other information, the CTE for each tradable 
farm product is assumed to be the same as the NRA from border distortions and the CTE for 
nontradable farm products is assumed to be zero.  
To obtain dollar values of farmer assistance and consumer taxation, we have taken the 
country authors’ NRA estimates and multiplied them by the gross value of production at 
undistorted prices to obtain an estimate in US dollars of the direct gross subsidy equivalent of 
assistance to farmers (GSE). These GSE values are calculated in constant dollars, and are also 
expressed on per-farm-worker basis. Likewise a value of the consumer transfer is derived  
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from the CTE, by assuming the consumption value is the gross value of production at 
undistorted prices divided by the self-sufficiency ratio for each product (production divided 
by consumption, derived from national volume data or the FAO’s commodity balance 
sheets). These transfer values can be added up across products for a country, and across 
countries for any or all products, to get regional aggregate transfer estimates for the studied 
economies. That valuation is also helpful for generating an estimate of the contribution of 
each policy instrument to the overall NRA, and the trade data that provide the self-sufficiency 
ratio helped each country author attach a trade status to each product each year. 
Once each farm industry is classified either as import-competing, or a producer of 
exportables, or as producing a non-tradable (its status could change over time), it is possible 
to generate for each year the weighted average NRAs for the two different groups of tradable 



















where  m NRAag  and  x NRAag  are the average  NRAs for the import-competing and 
exportable parts of the agricultural sector (their weighted average being 
t NRAag ). This index 
has a value of zero when the import-competing and export sub-sectors are equally assisted, 
and its lower bound approaches -1 in the most extreme case of an anti-trade policy bias. 
Anderson and Neary (2005) show also that it is possible to develop a single index that 
captures the extent to which import protection reduces the volume of trade. Once NRAs and 
CTEs have been calculated, Lloyd, Croser and Anderson (2009) show how they can be used 
to generate a more-general Trade Reduction Index (TRI), that allows for the trade effects also 
of domestic price-distorting policies, and regardless of whether they (or the trade measures) 
are positive or negative. Such a measure is the percentage agricultural trade tax (or uniform 
NRA and CTE) which, if applied equally to all agricultural tradables, would generate the 
same reduction in trade volume as the actual intra-sectoral structure of distortions to domestic 
prices of tradable farm goods. They also show that, if the domestic price elasticities of supply 
(demand) are equal across farm commodities, then again the only information needed to 
estimate the TRI, in addition to the NRAs and CTEs, is the share of each commodity in the 
domestic value of farm production (consumption) at undistorted prices. 
Needless to say, there are numerous challenges in applying the above methodology, 
especially in less developed economies with poor-quality data. Ways to deal with the 
standard challenges are detailed in Anderson et al. (2008) and the country-specific challenges  
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are discussed in the analytical narratives in the regional and global volumes listed in footnote 
6 above. 
We turn now to summarizing the stylized facts that have emerged from Anderson and 
Valenzuela’s (2008) compilation and aggregation of the NRAs and related estimates provided 
by the project’s country case studies, and Anderson and Croser’s (2009) estimation of the 
WRIs and TRIs, from which numerous questions emerge for political economy theorists, 
historians and econometricians to address.  
 
 
Stylized facts: global agricultural distortion patterns 
 
 
For the purposes of the present study, the world economy is divided into high-income 
countries (Western Europe, the United States/Canada, Japan, and Australia/New Zealand),
11 
three developing country regions (Africa, Asia and Latin America), and Europe’s economies 
that were in transition from socialism in the 1990s plus Turkey.
12
  North America and Europe (including the newly acceded eastern members of the EU) 
each account for one-third of global GDP, and the remaining one-third is shared almost 
equally by developing countries and the other high-income countries.
  
13
Asia has had much faster economic growth and export-led industrialization than the 
rest of the world: since 1980, Asia’s per capita GDP has grown at four times, and exports 
nearly two times, the global averages, and the share of Asia’s GDP that is exported is now 
 When the focus turns 
to just agriculture, however, developing countries are responsible for slightly over half the 
value added globally, with Asia accounting for two-thirds of that lion’s share. The developing 
countries’ majority becomes stronger still in terms of global population and even more so in 
terms of farmers, almost three-quarters of whom are in Asian developing countries. Hence 
the vast range of per capita incomes and agricultural land per capita, and thus agricultural 
comparative advantages, across the country groups in table 1.  
                                                 
11 Korea and Taiwan are categorized here as ‘developing’ rather than high-income because at the beginning of 
the 50-year period under study they were among the poorest economies in the world. 
12 Turkey is included in this last group because it is in the same geographic region and, like others in that region, 
has been seeking European Union accession which has influenced the evolution of its agricultural price and 
trade policies. 
13 The only countries not well represented in the sample are those middle- to high-income ones in the Middle 
East and the many small (often low-income) ones elsewhere that together account for less than 4 percent of the 
global economy.  
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one-third above that for the rest of the world and for Latin America and far above that for 
Africa (Sandri, Valenzuela and Anderson 2007). Asia’s GDP per capita is now half as high 
again as that of our focus African countries, although still only one-third that of Latin 
America (table 1). However, in the earlier half of our time series Asia was poorer than Africa 
and hence the poorest of the country groups in table 1. 
By 2000-04 just 12 percent of Asia’s GDP came from agriculture on average. That 
contrasts with Africa where the share for our focus countries ranges from 20 to 40 percent, 
and with Latin America and Europe’s transition economies where it is down to 6 percent (and 
to just 2 percent on average in high-income countries). The share of employment in 
agriculture remains very high in Asia though, at just under 60 percent – which is the same as 
in Africa and three times the share in Latin America and Eastern Europe, although more 
farmers work part-time on their farms in Asia than in other developing countries. By contrast, 
less than 4 percent of workers in high-income countries are still engaged in agriculture. 
Hence the much greater importance to developing country welfare, inequality and poverty of 
own-country and rest-of-world distortions to agricultural incentives. 
 
Regional NRAs and RRAs: rising with economic growth and industrialization 
 
We turn first to the estimates of NRAs for covered products plus non-product-specific 
assistance and guesstimates of assistance to the roughly 30 percent of the value of farm 
products that have not been included in the study’s explicit price comparison exercise. These 
are summarized in table 2, from which (in combination with the right-hand half of table 1) it 
is apparent that the NRAs are higher, the higher a region’s income per capita and the weaker 
its agricultural comparative advantage. The NRAs are also rising over time, and fastest for 
fastest-growing Asia and least so for slowest-growing Africa, with the exception of declines 
in Western Europe and Australia/New Zealand since the late 1980s. For developing countries 
as a whole, their average NRA has gradually moved from more than 20 percent below zero in 
the 1960s and 1970s to 9 percent above zero during 2000-04. 
When the changes in NRAs to non-farm tradable sectors are taken into account by 
calculating the RRA, the intersectoral changes in distortions are even starker. Table 3 shows 
that Latin America, Asia and Australia/New Zealand all had high rates of manufacturing 
protection in the first half of the period that were dramatically reduced over the most recent 
three decades. As a result, the RRA for developing countries as a group has transformed from 
-50 percent prior to the mid-1970s to slightly above zero by the end of the 1990s. The RRA  
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for Australia/New Zealand was also negative in the first half of the period (averaging more 
than 10 percent below zero) but notwithstanding the decline in its NRA for farm products the 
RRA has risen almost to zero because the manufacturing protection cuts were bigger than the 
cuts in farm subsidies (as explained in Anderson, Lloyd and MacLaren 2007). Even in the 
other high-income countries the decline in manufacturing protection has accentuated the 
improvement in farm incentives prior to the 1990s.  
Western Europe is the only significant region where the agricultural sector trend 
RRAs have declined as incomes have grown, and only since the late 1980s. That does not 
take account of the fact that there has been much re-instrumentation of support for farmers in 
Western Europe over the past two decades. When payments decoupled from farm production 
are included in the NRA, there was very little decline in the trend level of overall farmer 
assistance between 1986 and 2004. The drop since then (figure 1) is not due to any policy 
change in Europe but simply a rise in international food prices that has not been passed on to 
farmers there – and which will have since bounced back with the crash in those food prices in 
the second half of 2008. 
Using the full data set of countries and years, the positive relationship between RRA 
and real national GDP per capita is very clear from figure 2, with developing countries 
having the archtypical anti-agricultural bias (RRA<0) and high-income countries having the 
pro-agricultural bias described in Anderson (1995). The negative relationship between 
agricultural comparative advantage and NRA or RRA is not quite as strong, but it is certainly 
visible, as in figure 3 for RRAs. The individual country average agricultural NRA and RRA, 
shown for 2000-04 in figure 4, lends further visual support to these tendencies. They suggest 
strongly that the world’s agricultural production is far from optimally distributed around the 
globe or even within each continent. That is, the world’s farm resources are being squandered 
by this wide dispersion of NRAs and RRAs. 
Together these data suggest at least six stylized facts: 
•  Fact 1: National nominal and relative rates of assistance to agriculture tend to be 
higher, the higher the country’s income per capita; 
•  Fact 2: National nominal and relative rates of assistance to agriculture tend to be 
higher, the weaker the country’s agricultural comparative advantage;  
•  Fact 3: As a corollary to Facts 1 and 2, national nominal and relative rates of 
assistance to agriculture tend to rise over time as the country’s per capita income  
12 
 
rises, and more so the more that growth is accompanied by a decline in agricultural 
comparative advantage. 
•  Fact 4: While there is a wide range in the trend levels of agricultural sector NRAs and 
RRAs and in their rates of change in both high-income and developing countries, over 
most of the past half century the policy regime on average in developing countries has 
had an anti-agricultural bias and in high-income countries it has had a pro-agricultural 
bias; 
•  Fact 5: The only significant region where the agricultural sector trend RRAs have 
declined as incomes have grown is Western Europe since the late 1980s, but the 
decline in the trend level of overall farmer assistance has declined little when 
payments decoupled from farm production are included; and 
•  Fact 6: The only other countries where the agricultural sector trend NRA has declined 
as incomes have grown are Australia and New Zealand since the 1970s, but there it 
was tolerated by farmers because it was accompanied by even larger reductions in 
manufacturing protection such that the RRA rose for farmers there (not unlike in 
many developing countries).  
 
Wide dispersion of product NRAs 
 
The regional average NRAs just discussed hide a great deal of diversity across products and 
countries, including within each region. This can be seen clearly from national Box plots 
shown in Figure A.4 in the Appendix to this volume (Anderson and Croser 2010). One other 
way of summarizing the within-country NRA diversity across products is to calculate the 
standard deviation around the mean NRA for all covered farm products each year. Even when 
that is averaged over 5-year periods and for whole geographic regions, the diversity is still 
evident (table 4). What is also evident from that table is that the average of those standard 
deviations for all 75 focus countries is hardly any lower in the second half of the period than 
it is in the first half. This has important welfare implications, because the cost of government 
policy distortions to incentives in terms of resource misallocation tend to be greater the 
greater the degree of substitution in production (Lloyd 1974). In the case of agriculture which 
involves the use of farm land that is sector-specific but transferable among farm activities, the 
greater the variation of NRAs across industries within the sector, the higher will be the 
welfare cost of those market interventions.  
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  That wide range of product NRAs carries over globally too. The Box plots for the 
regions are shown in Figure A.3 in the Appendix to this volume (Anderson and Croser 2010), 
and a summary for the world is provided in figure 5 for a dozen key products. Each of those 
figures reveals the range of NRAs over the sample time period (the long bar), with the shaded 
area showing where 95 percent of the NRAs fall, and the vertical line within that shows the 
mean NRA for the sample for each product. 
  When developing and high-income countries are considered separately, it is revealed 
that the rice pudding ingredients of sugar, rice and milk are the most protected in both sets of 
countries in 2000-04 (figure 6). Cotton, on the other hand, is protected in high-income 
countries but taxed in developing countries, while prices of inputs into livestock feedmixes 
(maize, soybean, pork, poultry) are only distorted in both sets of countries.  
These data suggest another three stylized facts: 
•  Fact 7: Within the agricultural sector of each country, whether developed or 
developing, there is a wide range of product NRAs; 
•  Fact 8: Despite the fall in average agricultural NRAs, the across-product standard 
deviation of NRAs around the national average each year is no less in the present 
decade than it was in the three previous decades for both developed and developing 
countries; and 
•  Fact 9: Some product NRAs are positive and high in almost all countries (sugar, rice 
and milk), others are positive and high in developed economies but highly negative in 
developing countries (most noticeably cotton), and yet others are relatively low in all 
countries (feedgrains, soybean, pork, poultry).  
 
Anti- trade bias in NRAs 
 
The most robust NRA estimates are for the covered farm products for which direct price 
comparisons have been made. Those products have been categorized each year as either 
exportable, import-competing or nontradable. Figure 7 summarizes those NRAs and reveals a 
marked difference in the levels of support to import-competing versus exportable farm 
products. Exportables in high-income countries received relatively little support other than 
during the export subsidy ‘war’ of the mid-1980s, while in developing countries they were 
increasingly taxed from the late 1950s until the 1980s and then that taxation was gradually 
phased out (although some taxes remained in 2000-04, for example in Argentina).  
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Importables, by contrast, have been assisted throughout the past five decades in both 
developed and developing countries on average (even though some import subsidization of 
staple foods occurred from time to time in low-income countries), and the long-run fitted 
trend line has almost the same slope for both sets of countries, albeit with a lower intercept 
for developing countries. 
  Part of the anti-trade bias in developing countries was the result of government 
intervention in the domestic market for foreign currency. The most common arrangement was 
a dual exchange rate, whereby exporters had to sell part or all of their foreign currency to the 
government at a low price. This effectively taxed and thus discouraged production of 
exportables. At the same time it created an artificial shortage of foreign currency so that 
potential importers bid up its purchase price, which had the same effect as an import tax and 
thus encouraged import-competing production. The size of these effective if implicit trade 
taxes depends on the extent to which the government purchase price is misaligned with what 
would be the free-market equilibrium price, the price elasticities of demand for and supply of 
foreign currency, and the retention rate. In some countries there were more-complex multiple 
exchange rates, whereby traders of some products were subject to more favorable treatment 
than others. In estimating NRAs in developing countries, participants in the Agricultural 
Distortions research project endeavored to include the effects of these implicit trade taxes, 
and to show how much impact they had on the NRAs and RRA (see Anderson et al. 2008, 
which draws on Dervis, de Melo and Robinson 1981). The practice was rife in newly 
independent developing countries in the 1960s and 1970s, but was gradually phased out over 
the 1980s and early 1990s as part of overall macroeconomic policy reform initiatives.  
  The net effect of all the explicit and implicit trade taxes and subsidies, together with 
domestic taxes and subsidies on tradable farm products, is that the NRA for exportable farm 
products is typically well below the NRA for importables, so that the trade bias index, as 
defined in the methodology section above, is negative. Table 5 shows that the anti-
agricultural trade bias index has declined over time for the developing country group, but 
mainly because of the decline in agricultural export taxation and in spite of growth in 
agricultural import protection. For the high-income group, the anti-agricultural trade bias 
index has shown little trend over time. That is mainly because the rise and then decline in 
agricultural export subsidies has been matched by a similar trajectory for import protection. 
The two sub-sectors to which that index’s NRAs refer (exportable and import-
competing farm products, respectively) are not equal contributors to overall farm production, 
however, so the trade bias index when weighted across numerous products/countries is not a  
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perfect indicator. A superior one is the trade-reduction index discussed in the methodology 
section above. The trade-reduction index (and, incidentally, the welfare-reduction index) 
associated with NRAs and CTEs for covered agricultural products have fallen substantially 
since the latter 1980s for both high-income and developing country groups and hence 
globally (figure 8). That fall in the TRI has been more because of the fall in national mean 
NRAs than in their variance, however. 
These features of government intervention suggest another five stylized facts: 
•  Fact 10: With respect to individual farm products, the NRA tends to be lower the 
stronger the country’s comparative advantage in that product; 
•  Fact 11: As a corollary to Fact 10, the agricultural policy regime of each country 
tends to have an anti-trade bias; 
•  Fact 12: The anti-agricultural trade bias has declined over time for the developing 
country group, but mainly because of the decline in agricultural export taxation and in 
spite of growth in agricultural import protection, whereas for the high-income group, 
the anti-agricultural trade bias has shown little trend over time, mainly because the 
rise and then decline in agricultural export subsidies has been matched by a similar 
trajectory for import protection; 
•  Fact 13: The trade-reduction (and the welfare-reduction) indexes associated with 
NRAs and CTEs for covered agricultural products have fallen substantially since the 
latter 1980s for both high-income and developing country groups and hence globally, 
but more because of the fall in national mean NRAs than in their variance; and  
•  Fact 14: Up to the 1980s and in some cases early 1990s it was not uncommon for 
government interventions in the market for foreign exchange in developing countries 
to add to the overall anti-trade bias in policy regimes, but those interventions had all 
but disappeared by the mid-1990s as part of overall macroeconomic policy reform 
initiatives.  
 
Volatility of NRAs 
 
If a country would be close to self-sufficient in a product under free markets, but there is a 
significant transport cost associated with importing or exporting it, then there would be no 
trade in this product except in years when the international price was relatively high or low. 
In the absense of government intervention, the NRA would be zero regardless of whether  
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trade took place, but without trade the domestic price could be anywhere within the range of 
the fob export price and the cif import price. If import and export taxes or quantitative 
restrictions applied, they would make trade even less likely and they would widen the range 
of variation in the domestic price of this mostly nontraded good. In that case the interventions 
would cause the estimated NRA to switch from negative to zero to positive and back to zero 
as and when the international price gyrated well above and below trend.   
A much more common reason for NRAs to vary from year to year, though, is because 
the government deliberately seeks to reduce fluctuations in domestic food prices and in the 
quantities available for consumption. One way for a country to achieve that objective is by 
varying the restrictions on its international trade in food according to seasonal conditions 
domestically and changes in prices internationally. Effectively this involves exporting 
domestic instability and not importing instability from abroad. 
To distinguish between these two sources of volatility in the NRA for a product 
whose national self sufficiency is always close to zero, one can compare the movements in 
domestic versus border prices. As an illustration, figure 9 does that for rice in India: clearly in 
that case the government has been able to maintain an almost-constant real domestic rice 
price for decades despite huge fluctuations in the international price of rice. Indeed that has 
been the practice of most governments in South and Southeast Asia, where rice is the 
predominant food staple. As a result, since Asia produces and consumes four-fifths of the 
world’s rice (compared with about one-third of the world’s wheat and maize), this market-
insulating behavior of Asian policy makers means that very little rice production has been 
traded internationally: less than 7 percent in 2000-04,
14 compared with 14 and 24 percent for 
maize and wheat. This insulating behavior of governments
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To get a sense of how much this practice varies across products and whether it has 
changed much since policy reforms began around the mid-1980s, table 6 reports the average 
across focus countries of the percentage point deviation each year of national NRAs for 12 
key farm products around their trend value for the sub-periods before and from 1985. For 
most products that indicator is lower in the latter period, the exceptions being rice, wheat and 
(at least in developing countries) soybean. Rice had one of the smaller average deviations in 
 also means international prices 
are much more volatile for rice than for those other grains.  
                                                 
14 This was up from the pre-1990s half-decade global shares which are all less than 4.5 percent (Anderson and 
Valenzuela 2008). 
15 This begger-thy-neighbor dimension of each country’s policy is not restricted to developing countries. In 
high-income coountries, however, the motivation for intervention is more commonly concern for instability in 




the earlier period, but by the latter period rice shared the honour of the largest deviations with 
sugar and milk.  
That nominal rates of protection tend to be above trend in years of low international 
prices and conversely in years when international prices are high is clear from table 7, which 
shows the extent of the negative correlation between the NRAs for varuious products and 
their international price. That coefficient globally and in high-income countries is negative 
for all but beef, and even in the various developing country regions it is negative in all but 
one-quarter of the cases. For almost all of those 12 products the regional correlation is highest 
for the South Asian region. Among the developing countries it is again rice, sugar and milk 
that have the highest correlation coefficients.  
One other way of capturing this phenomenon is to estimate the elasticity of 
transmission of the international product price to the domestic market. Following Tyers and 
Anderson (1992, pp. 65-75), we use a geometric lag formulation to estimate elasticities for 
each product for all focus countries for the period 1985 to 2007. The average of estimates for 
the short run elasticity ranged from a low of 0.3 for sugar and milk to 0.5 for rice, wheat and 
pigmeat, 0.6 for cotton, cocoa, maize and poultry, and 0.7 for beef, soybean and coffee. The 
unweighted average across all of those 12 key products is 0.54, suggesting that within the 
first year little more than half the movement in international prices is transmitted 
domestically. Even the long run elasticity appears well short of unity after full adjustment: 
the average of the elasticities for those 12 products acoss the focus countries is just 0.69.  
These data provide two more stylized facts about government distortions to 
agricultural incentives: 
•  Fact 15: Around the long-run trend for each country there is much fluctuation from 
year to year in individual product NRAs, and while this tendency has diminished 
since the mid-1980s for most key products it has increased for rice and wheat; and 
•  Fact 16: Product NRAs tend to be negatively correlated with movements in 
international prices of the products in question (most so in developing countries for 
rice, sugar and milk), and on average barely half of the change in an international 
price is transmitted to domestic markets within the first year. 
 




Since the mid-1980s, when the GATT’s Uruguay Round got under way, it has been common 
in trade negotiations to focus on three sets of agricultural policy instruments that distort 
production and trade: import restrictions, export subsidies, and domestic producer subsidies. 
When the Doha round of negotiations was launched a decade ago, much of the focus of 
attention by developing countries was on farm subsidies by high-income countries, until it 
was shown that import restrictions were far more important to theirs – and global – economic 
welfare. According to the GTAP global economy wide model and protection database, 93 
percent of the global welfare cost of government interventions in agricultural markets as of 
2001 was due to market access restrictions, and only 5 percent to domestic support and 2 
percent to export subsidies (Anderson, Martin and Valenzuela 2006).  
However, that GTAP protection database does not include all the apparent export 
taxes, import subsidies and domestic producer taxes in developing countries identified in the 
World Bank’s new Database of Agricultural Distortions. But even when the fuller set of 
policy instruments from the new database are included, and even when the relatively new 
decoupled payments to farm households are counted, it is still the case that trade measures at 
the border (export and import taxes or subsidies and their equivalent from quantitative trade 
restrictions and multiple exchange rates) are the dominant forms of intervention. Table 8 
shows the various contributions of different policy measures to the overall estimated NRAs 
as of 1981-84 and 2000-04. In both periods, trade measures accounted for around three-fifths 
of the total NRA for both developing and high-income countries.
16
Trade measures are responsible for an even larger share – almost 90 percent – of the 
distortion to consumer prices of food, since direct domestic consumer subsidies (or taxes), as 
distinct from the indirect ones provided by border measures, are relatively rare (table 9). 
  
The dominance of trade measures in both consumer tax equivalents (CTEs) and NRAs 
for agricultural products means we should expect those two indicators to be highly correlated. 
And indeed that is the case: for all focus countries, covered products and available years in 
the panel set, the coefficient of correlation between NRAs and CTEs is 0.93 (see numbers in 
parentheses in the last column of table 7). 
                                                 
16 If one assumes that the price elasticities of supply and demand for farm products are equal, and that there are 
no costs of collecting taxes and dispersing them as subsidies, then the trade-reducing effects of trade measures 
would be twice as high as for an equally high NRA provided by production subsidies – and an even bigger 
multiple of the effects of so-called decoupled payments, depending on the extent to which the latter are in 
practice truly decoupled from production decisions. Furthermore, the welfare-reducing effects of trade measures 
are in proportion to the square of the trade tax-cum-subsidy. Thus border measures would be responsible for 
much more than three-fifths of the global welfare cost of distortions to agricultural prices, and possibly not 
much below the more-limited but widely quoted estimate for 2001 of 93 percent by Anderson, Martin and 
Valenzuela (2006).  
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Subsidies to farm inputs, and support for public agricultural research, have been 
common but have added little to overall farmer assistance in high-income countries, and have 
done very little to offset the effective taxation of farmers in developing countries. The most 
notable exception is India, where large subsidies to fertilizer, water and power for irrigation 
add several percentage points to India’s agricultural NRA. The bottom row of table 8 reports 
expenditure on public agricultural research and development expressed as a percentage of 
gross agricultural production valued at undistorted prices. Despite the estimated high social 
rates of return at the margin to such public investment (Pardey et al. 2007), developing 
countries invest less than 0.4 percent of the value of their farm output on agricultural 
research, or less than half the intensity of agricultural R&D in high-income countries. 
Three more stylized facts about government distortions to agricultural incentives thus 
can be listed: 
•  Fact 17: Even when decoupled payments are included in total support payments, 
trade policy instruments (export and import taxes, subsidies or quantitative 
restrictions plus dual exchange rates) account for no less than three-fifths of 
agricultural NRAs, and hence for an even larger share of their global welfare cost 
(since trade measures also tax consumers, and welfare costs are proportional to the 
square of a trade tax), with domestic subsidies to or taxes on farm output making only 
minor contributions; 
•  Fact 18: Direct subsidies to (or taxes on) food consumption have been very minor, 
hence consumer tax equivalents (CTEs) tend to be highly correlated with NRAs for 
agricultural products; and 
•  Fact 19: Subsidies to farm inputs, and support for public agricultural research, have 
been common but have added little to overall farmer assistance in high-income 
countries and have done very little to offset the effective taxation of farmers in 
developing countries. 
 
Contribution to rising RRA of reforms in non-farm sectors 
 
Trade policies have contributed even more to agricultural distortions than indicated in the 
NRA and CTE estimates in tables 8 and 9, because they are also responsible for all of the 
estimated distortions to the NRA facing producers of non-farm tradable goods. Most of the 
country case studies contributing to the World Bank’s Agricultural Distortions database were  
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able to include only tariffs (in addition to exchange rate distortions) in their estimates of non-
agricultural NRAs. They therefore understate those NRAs, especially in earlier decades when 
non-tariff barriers to imports of manufactures were rife. Hence they also understate the 
contribution of the decline in those rates to the rise in the RRA. Notwithstanding those biases, 
that latter contribution is still estimated to have been very substantial. To see this, we report 
in table 10 what the RRA would have been in different regions in 2000-04 had the NRA for 
non-agricultural tradable goods not changed from its (relatively high) level during the pre-
reform period of 1960-84. The final column of that table indicates that slightly over half of 
the rise in the RRA for developing countries since the mid-1980s, and two-thirds of the RRA 
rise for high-income countries, is due to falls in protection to producers of non-farm tradable 
goods. This suggests much of the reduction in relative prices faced by farmers over the past 
two decades can be attributed to general trade liberalization rather than to specific farm 
policy reform. 
  Our final stylized fact is thus: 
•  Fact 20: The fall in assistance to producers of non-farm tradable goods has 
contributed to more than half the rise since the mid-1980s in the RRA for developing 
countries, and as much as two-thirds of the RRA rise for high-income countries. 
 
 
What still needs explaining  
 
 
The above stylized facts (a) confirm some things that were well established and understood 
two decades ago and (b) highlight a lot more variation in NRAs and RRAs across countries 
and products and time that still requires explanation. 
The most robust facts have to do with the correlation between assistance to farmers 
and both per capita income and agricultural comparative advantage. Reasons for expecting 
those facts have been spelt out in such writings and Anderson, Hayami and Others (1986), 
Krueger (1992), Anderson (1995) and de Gorter and Swinnen (2002). How much do they 
explain of the variation across countries and time in national NRAs and RRAs that is 
captured in the new agricultural distortions panel database? Table 11 reports the simplest of 
OLS regressions using the full panel of data for all focus countries from 1955 to 2007. The 
log of real GDP per capita on its own accounts for nearly 40 percent of the national average 
NRA variation. Figure 2 above suggests a quadratic relationship, and indeed when the log of  
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that variable is included the adjusted R
2 rises to 0.44. If the log of arable land per capita is 
added, to represent the factor endowment ratio affecting agricultural comparative advantage, 
the adjusted R
2 increases further to 0.55.
17 In each of those regressions all variables are 
significant at the 1 percent level and with the expected sign.
18
When those panel data are separated by region, however, there is a considerable range 
in the extent to which those two variables account for the variation across countries. In the 
case of RRAs, table 12 shows that the adjusted R
2 is a high 0.72 for Asia, a moderate 0.33 
and 0.42 for Latin America and high-income countries, respectively, but just 0.07 for Africa. 
Clearly there is a great deal more heterogeneity among countries to be explained outside of 
Asia, and especially in Africa. 
 When we switch the variable 
being explained from NRA to RRA, the adjusted R
2 is a few points higher in each case and is 
0.59 in the case of the final regression. That is, these two variables alone – per capita income 
and a factor endowment indicator of agricultural comparative advantage – explain a little 
more than half of the variation in the full panel’s NRAs and RRAs. 
Incidentally, we used the NRA counterparts to the RRA regressions in table 12 to 
predict the NRAs in non-focus countries in each developing country region, so as to explore 
the representativeness of the sample of focus developing countries (which account for 91 
percent of agricultural output of all developing countries, as compared with virtually 100 
percent for high-income countries). Those predictions, shown in Table 13, suggest three 
things. One is that the impact on the aggregate average NRA for developing countries of 
omitting those non-focus countries is very minor, changing it in 2000-04 only from 9 to 8 
percent (and hence affecting the estimated global NRA by only half of one percentage point). 
The second thing to note is that the missing countries in each of Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia 
and Latin American have an average predicted NRA below that estimated for the region’s 
focus countries, but by no more than 2 percentage points, suggesting the non-focus countries 
of each region are slightly poorer and/or more agrarian than the focus countries of the region. 
And thirdly, the predicted NRA for the developing countries of the Middle East and North 
Africa (excluding Egypt) is slightly above the estimated NRA for focus developing countries, 
which is consistent with the fact that those MENA countries have relatively high per capita 
incomes and low agricultural comparative advantages.  
                                                 
17 Logs of these variables are used to reduce the influence of outliers. 
18 So too is a variable representing comparative advantage in non-farm primary products (net exports as a 
proportion of the sum of gross exports and gross imports of such products), although it has little impact on the 
R
2 and slightly reduces the adjusted R
2 so we have not included that regression in the table.  
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Also well-known two decades ago was that NRAs vary greatly across the product 
range, both within country groups and globally, and tend to be higher for import-competing 
producers than for exporters of the product in question. The former point is illustrated in 
Figure 6 above for the most important traded farm products, and the anti-trade bias of farm 
policies is clear from table 5. When the global NRAs for each of ten key traded products are 
regressed on the log of real GDP per capita, log of arable land per capita and a dummy for to 
distinguish exportable from import-competing products, the adjusted R
2 is above 0.32 for 
beef, milk, rice and wheat, and between 0.28 and 0.31 for pigmeat, poultry, soybean and 
sugar (and 0.23 for cotton and 0.20 for maize – see table 14). The income coefficients are all 
highly significant with the expected signs, as are the coefficients for land endowment except 
for cotton. The coefficients on the dummy variable used to distinguish exportable from 
import-competing products are significant at the 1 percent level for all but soybean, and have 
the expected sign in all cases except pigmeat. This table of results suggests that another area 
where further political economy analysis would be helpful is at the commodity level. In 
addition to seeking to explain the differences in R
2 values in that table, a more-specific 
question is: why are some farm industries more protected than others in both rich and poor 
countries (e.g., sugar, dairy), more taxed than others in poor countries (e.g., perennial tropical 
crops), and taxed in poor countries but subsidized in rich countries (even though they may be 
exported by the latter, as with cotton in the United States)?  
The above tables and figures provide but a beginning to the questions that might be 
posed following further scrutiny of the panel data. We conclude by simply listing some of the 
other questions that political economists might address, a few of which are taken up in the 
chapters that follow in this volume: 
•  What are the political economy forces behind the trend declines in positive 
agricultural NRAs in some high-income countries, and how do they differ from those 
in countries where agricultural NRAs remain or continue to grow? 
•  What are the political economy forces behind the more-reforming developing 
countries that have reduced/eliminated their anti-agricultural policy bias, and how do 
they differ from those in less-successful countries where negative distortions to 
agricultural incentives remain? 
•  In particular, what explains the differing pace and timing of the reforms in the various 
reforming countries?  
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•  What explains the exceptional developing country policy reversals in which the anti-
agricultural bias has worsened (such as in Zimbabwe from the mid-1990s and the 
reversion back to agricultural export taxation in Argentina after 2001)? 
•  What explains the choices of (typically n-th best) policy instruments, including 
exchange rates and the simultaneous use of measures that help and hurt farmers?  
•  In particular, why have countries tended to have an anti-trade bias in their distortions 
pattern within the agricultural sector? What explains the exceptions such as export or 
import subsidies? 
•  What explains the evolution of policy instrument choice over time, including towards 
more decoupled forms of domestic support in some but not all high-income countries 
(e.g. single farm payments) and yet a continuing reluctance to end inefficient farm 
programs such as by providing one-off lump-sum buy-outs?  
•  Why have governments used trade policy instruments when trying to reduce year-to-
year fluctuations around trend levels of domestic prices for producers or consumers of 
some farm products, rather than more-efficient instruments?  
•  Why have societies tended to under-invest in what appear to be high-payoff public 
investments such as in agricultural research, rural infrastructure, and basic rural 
education and health, and instead spend scarce public funds on distortionary subsidies 
(e.g. credit, fertilizer) or charge inadequately for some other items (e.g. water, power, 
environmental damage), all of which tend to add to inequality by assisting large 
farmers more than small farmers? 
•  What influence have international institutional and market forces (loan conditionality, 
GATT rounds, regional integration agreements, WTO accession, non-reciprocal trade 
agreements (e.g., for former colonies and Least Developed Countries), globalization 
of supermarkets and other firms along the value chain) had on the extent, pattern and 
evolution of distortions to agricultural incentives, relative to domestic political forces, 
especially in bringing about reform during the past two decades in contrast to the 
earlier decades of worsening distortions analyzed by Krueger, Schiff and Valdes (and 
others) in the 1980s?  
 
 





The first wave of densely populated industrializers (Britain, other Western Europe, then 
Japan, and then Korea and Taiwan) chose to slow the growth of food import dependence by 
raising their NRA for import-competing agriculture even as they were bringing down their 
NRA for non-farm tradables, such that their RRA became increasingly above the neutral zero 
level. Only in the past decade or two has the world seen a second example of declining RRAs 
(the first one being in the mid-19
th century in Europe), as the European Union (EU) began to 
re-instrument its assistance by moving toward decoupled payments. The reason for that 
exception has to do with the EU’s unique institutional provision of supra-national support via 
its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). As explained by Josling (2009), the decline in price 
supports in the EU is occuring largely because the budgetary cost of continuing past levels of 
support would have sky-rocketed following the EU membership expansion eastwards, with 
little if any of those extra payments going to the traditional lobbyists for the CAP.  
This almost complete absence of examples of reforms aimed at reducing relative 
assistance to farmers is not inconsistent with the fact that the GATT and now WTO members 
have found it extremely difficult to conclude multilateral agreements to reduce support for 
agriculture. It begs a key question: will more developing countries follow the example of 
earlier industrializers?  
The past close association of RRAs with rising per capita income and falling 
agricultural comparative advantage (see figures 2 and 3) suggests that, in the absense of any 
new shocks to the political equilibria, one should expect this to continue in the decades 
ahead. From a global viewpoint the most important developing countries to watch are the 
largest and fastest growing, namely China and India, both of which also happen to be 
relatively densely populated and hence vulnerable to declines in their agricultural 
comparative advantages as they become more industrialized. When their RRA trends are 
mapped against per capita income for the past three-plus decades as in figure 10, it is clear 
that to date China and India have been on the same trajectory as richer Northeast Asian 
economies.  
One reason one might expect different government behavior now is because the 
earlier industrializers were not bound under GATT to keep down their agricultural protection. 
At the time of China’s accession to WTO in December 2001, its NRA was 7.3 percent for 
just import-competing agriculture (Huang et al. 2009). Its average bound import tariff 
commitment was about twice that (16 percent in 2005), but what matters most is China’s out-
of-quota bindings on the items whose imports are restricted by tariff rate quotas. The latter  
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tariff bindings as of 2005 were 65 percent for grains, 50 percent for sugar and 40 percent for 
cotton (WTO, ITC and UNCTAD 2007, p. 60). China also has bindings on farm product-
specific domestic supports of 8.5 percent, and can provide another 8.5 percent as non-product 
specific assistance if it so wishes – a total 17 percent NRA from domestic support measures 
alone, in addition to what is available through out-of-quota tariff protection. Clearly the legal 
commitments China made on acceding to WTO are a long way from current levels of 
domestic and border support for its farmers, and so are unlikely to constrain the government 
very much in the next decade or so;
19
One oft-stated reason for governments being inclined to keep raising the RRA over 
time is that they fear a laissez faire strategy could increase rural-urban inequality and poverty 
and thereby generate social unrest (Hayami 2007). Available evidence suggests that problems 
of rural-urban poverty gaps have been alleviated in parts of Asia and Africa by some of the 
more-mobile members of farm households finding full- or part-time work off the farm 
(including abroad as guest workers) and repatriating part of their higher earnings back to 
those remaining in farm households (Otsuka and Yamano 2006, Otsuka, Estudillo and 
Sawada 2009). But these are only fragmentary elements of the developments that are altering 
the political economy of agricultural policies in emerging economies. Much more systematic 
analysis of the evolving political economy is needed not only to address the question as to 
whether more developing countries will become more agricultural protectionist but also to 
suggest politically feasible ways of countering that tendency of the past. 
 and the legal constraints on Asia’s developing countries 
that joined the WTO earlier (except for Korea) are even less constraining. For India, Pakistan 
and Bangladesh, for example, their estimated NRAs for agricultural importables in 2000-04 
are 34, 4 and 6 percent, respectively, whereas the average bound tariffs on their agricultural 
imports are 114, 96 and 189 percent, respectively (WTO, ITC and UNCTAD 2007). Also, 
like other developing countries, they have high bindings on product-specific domestic 
supports of 10 percent and another 10 percent for non-product specific assistance, a total of 
20 more percentage points of NRA that legally could come from domestic support measures 
– compared with currently 10 percent in India and less than 3 percent in the rest of South 
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Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) as reported in Josling (2009), which draws heavily 
on OECD (2008) for calculations from 1979.  
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  Coefficient  Standard error  R
2 
DCs  0.26   0.02  0.17 
HICs  0.28  0.03  0.14 
 






Figure 3: Relationships between agricultural comparative advantage
a and RRA, all 75 focus 






a Net exports divided by the sum of exports and imports of agricultural products. 
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Source: Authors’ derivation using data in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). 
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Figure 6: Nominal rates of assistance, key covered products, high-income and developing 












































Figure 7: Nominal rates of assistance to exportable, import-competing and all covered 
agricultural products,






























a Covered products only. The total also includes nontradables. 
 
Source: Authors’ derivation, using data in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008).  
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Figure 8: Nominal Rate of Assistance and Trade and Welfare Reduction Indexes for covered 










Figure 9: Real domestic producer and international reference prices for rice, India, 1965 to 
2004 











Figure 10: RRAs and log of real per capita GDP, India and Northeast Asian focus economies, 1955
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a From only 1965 for India and 1981 for China. 
Source:  Authors’ derivation based on RRAs in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008).  
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Table 1: Key economic and trade indicators of focus countries, by region, 2000–04  
 
  Share (%) of world:  National relative to world (world=100)  Agric trade 
special-ization 
index
b    Pop’n 
 





 per capita 
RCA,
a  
agric & food 
Africa 
10  1  6  11  14  148  na 
na 
Asia 
51  10  37  73  20  34  80  -0.03 
Latin America 
8  5  8  3  64  171  na  
na 
Europe and Central Asia 
7  4  6  3  48  178  na  
na 
Western Europe 
6  29  16  1  454  46  106  -0.03 
United States and Canada 
5  33  11  0.3  636  186  119  0.08 
Australia and New Zealand 
0.4  2  2  0.1  405  2454  354  0.62 
Japan 
2  13  5  0.2  610  5  12  -0.84 
All focus countries 
90  96  91  92 
na  na  na  na 
Other (non-focus) developing  
  and transition economies  10  4  9  8 
na  na  na  na 
Source: Sandri, Valenzuela and Anderson (2007), compiled mainly from World Bank (2007) and FAO (2007). 
a. Revealed comparative advantage index is the share of agriculture and processed food in national exports as a ratio of that sector’s share of 
global exports.  
b. Primary agricultural trade specialization index is net exports as a ratio of the sum of exports and imports of agricultural and processed food 




Table 2: Nominal rates of assistance to agriculture,
a focus countries, 1955 to 2007
c 
 (percent)  
   1955-59  1960-64  1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-04  2005-07 
Africa  -14  -8  -11  -15  -13  -8  -1  -9  -6  -7  na 
Asia  -27  -27  -25  -25  -24  -21  -9  -2  8  12  na 
Latin America  -11  -8  -7  -21  -18  -13  -11  4  6  5  na 
Europe and Central Asia
b  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  10  18  18  25 
Western Europe  44  57  68  46  56  74  82  64  44  37  18 
United States and Canada  13  11  11  7  7  13  19  16  11  17  11 
Australia and New Zealand  6  7  10  8  8  11  9  4  3  1  2 
Japan  39  46  50  47  67  72  119  116  120  120  81 
                       
Developing countries  -26  -23  -22  -24  -22  -18  -8  -2  6  9  na 
High-income countries  
22  29  35  25  32  41  53  46  35  32 
17 
 
All focus countries (wted. average):  3  5  6  0  2  5  17  18  17  18  na 
 
Source: Authors’ derivation, using data in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). 
a. Weighted average for each country, including non-product specific assistance as well as authors’ guesstimates for non-covered farm products 
(but not decoupled assistance), with weights based on gross value of agricultural production at undistorted prices. Estimates for China pre-1981 
and India pre-1965 are based on the assumption that the nominal rate of assistance to agriculture in those years was the same as the average 
NRA estimates for those countries for 1981-84 and 1965-69, respectively, and that the gross value of production in those missing years is that 
which gives the same average share of value of production in total world production in 1981-84 and 1965-69, respectively. 
Developing country and world aggregates are computed accordingly.  
b ECA countries are not included in the high-income or developing country aggregates. 
42 
 
Table 3: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural and nonagricultural tradables, and 
the RRA,
























Africa                       
NRA agric.   na  -13.3  -19.6  -25.0  -22.1  -13.5  -0.3  -15.4  -8.7  -12.0  na 
NRA non-agric.  na  3.7  2.7  1.5  5.7  1.6  9.2  2.7  2.0  7.3  na 
RRA  na  -15.2  -21.4  -26.0  -25.9  -13.1  -8.3  -17.1  -10.4  -18.0  na 
Latin America                       
NRA agric.   na  -11.4  -9.3  -23.0  -19.0  -12.9  -11.2  4.4  5.5  4.9  na 
NRA non-agric.  na  26.9  31.3  27.8  23.3  18.5  16.8  7.3  6.6  5.4  na 
RRA  na  -30.2  -30.9  -39.8  -34.2  -26.6  -24.0  -2.7  -1.0  -0.5  na 
South Asia
b                       
NRA agric.   na  4.1  4.4  9.7  -7.7  1.8  47.1  0.2  -2.4  12.7  na 
NRA non-agric.  na  114.4  117.8  81.7  57.8  54.6  39.9  18.6  15.0  10.1  na 
RRA  na  -51.5  -51.9  -39.8  -41.6  -33.3  5.1  -15.5  -14.9  3.4  na 
China and Southeast Asia
b                       
NRA agric.   na  -43.6  -42.6  -40.1  -35.7  -34.5  -27.8  -12.0  4.9  7.1  na 
NRA non-agric.  na  36.5  36.5  33.7  30.8  20.6  23.3  19.8  9.6  5.5  na 
RRA  na  -58.7  -58.0  -55.2  -50.8  -43.4  -41.6  -26.4  -4.2  1.5  na 
Japan, Korea and Taiwan                       
NRA agric.   30.1  39.9  48.8  51.3  75.5  78.8  124.3  129.9  130.5  138.1  126.1 
NRA non-agric.  8.6  8.3  6.1  4.2  3.5  2.4  2.5  1.4  1.1  0.6  1.0 
RRA  19.7  29.1  40.2  44.9  69.6  74.6  118.7  126.7  128.1  136.7  123.7 
European transition econs.                       
NRA agric.   na  na  na  na  na  na  na  10.0  18.3  16.1  17.0 
NRA non-agric.  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  9.8  5.5  4.6  2.7 
RRA  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  0.1  12.2  11.0  13.9 
Western Europe                       
NRA agric.   43.8  57.0  67.5  45.7  56.3  74.4  82.0  63.4  43.6  36.8  18.5 
NRA non-agric.  8.0  7.2  5.7  3.8  2.5  1.5  1.7  1.3  1.5  1.4  1.2 
RRA  33.1  46.5  58.6  40.4  52.6  71.9  79.0  61.3  41.5  34.9  17.1 
North America                       
NRA agric.   12.5  10.5  10.9  7.5  7.6  13.8  20.2  16.1  11.4  17.3  11.2 
NRA non-agric.  6.1  7.4  7.4  5.5  4.1  3.8  3.7  3.3  2.1  1.5  1.3 
RRA  6.0  2.9  3.3  1.8  3.4  9.7  15.8  12.4  9.1  15.5  9.7 
ANZ 
NRA agric.   5.5  6.6  8.3  7.9  7.3  10.6  8.7  4.3  2.9  1.0  0.6 
NRA non-agric.  20.0  21.5  24.0  19.7  14.3  13.5  10.3  6.4  3.4  2.4  2.4 
RRA  -12.1  -12.2  -12.6  -9.9  -6.1  -2.6  -1.5  -2.0  -0.5  -1.4  -1.8 
Developing countries
b 
NRA agric.   na  -24.0  -27.3  -31.9  -25.5  -21.0  -15.6  -3.9  4.0  7.4  na 
NRA non-agric.  na  58.3  60.0  45.8  37.3  34.6  27.0  16.7  9.8  6.3  na 
RRA  na  -52.0  -54.5  -53.3  -45.8  -41.3  -33.6  -17.6  -5.3  1.1  na 
High-income countries  
NRA agric.   23.0  30.9  36.8  26.5  34.7  43.0  55.5  48.2  36.6  33.9  18.3 
NRA non-agric.  7.5  8.5  7.7  5.4  3.6  3.4  3.2  2.5  1.7  1.3  -0.7 
RRA  14.3  20.6  27.1  19.9  30.1  38.3  50.6  44.6  34.3  32.1  19.2 
World
b 
NRA agric.   na  5.6  7.6  0.8  2.6  5.7  18.7  19.7  18.4  18.6  na 
NRA non-agric.  na  19.0  20.5  16.1  13.7  10.0  9.8  7.6  6.0  4.0  na 
RRA  na  -11.3  -10.7  -13.2  -9.8  -3.6  8.1  11.3  11.8  14.0  na 
Source: Authors’ derivation, using data in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). 





t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural 
and non-agricultural sectors, respectively. 
b. Estimates for the RRA for China pre-1981 and India pre-1965 are based on the 
assumption that the agricultural NRAs in those years were the same as the average  
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NRA estimates for those countries for 1981-84 and 1965-69, respectively, and that the 
value of production in those missing years is that which gives the same average share 
of value of production in total world production in 1981-84 and 1965-69, respectively. 
Developing and world country aggregates are computed accordingly.  
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Table 4: Dispersion of nominal rates of assistance across covered agricultural products,
a focus regions, 1965 to 2007
 
(percent)  
   1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-04  2005-07 
Africa  31  30  37  36  36  31  25  25  na 
Asia  56  42  49  53  66  56  57  64  na 
Latin America  49  44  52  52  44  42  32  40  na 
Europe and Central Asia  34  33  41  26  39  56  39  45  44 
Western Europe  119  85  112  98  122  86  69  74  64 
United States and Canada  29  15  31  62  71  39  31  37  28 
Australia and New Zealand  40  45  26  17  20  14  12  7  5 
Japan  69  82  156  143  175  162  136  143  116 
All focus countries (wted. average)  54  45  55  51  59  53  43  48  na 
Product coverage 
b  68  70  71  73  73  72  71  68  70 
Source: Authors’ derivation, using data in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). 
a. Dispersion for each region is a simple average of the country-level annual standard deviations around a weighted mean of NRAs per country 
across covered products each year. 
b. Share of gross value of total agricultural production at undistorted prices accounted for by covered products.  
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 Table 5: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural exportables, import-competing products, 
and the trade bias index,
























Africa                       
NRA agric. exportables  na  -30.1  -38.4  -42.6  -42.6  -35.0  -36.7  -35.8  -26.1  -24.6  na 
NRA agric. imp-comp  na  18.6  11.8  1.9  14.5  13.2  58.3  5.2  9.8  1.6  na 
Trade Bias Index  na  -0.41  -0.45  -0.44  -0.50  -0.43  -0.60  -0.39  -0.33  -0.26  na 
Latin America                       
NRA agric. exportables  na  -20.4  -12.8  -27.0  -25.2  -27.1  -25.0  -10.5  -3.5  -4.6  na 
NRA agric. imp-comp  na  26.3  8.7  -2.8  1.1  13.6  5.1  19.4  12.5  20.6  na 
Trade Bias Index  na  -0.37  -0.20  -0.25  -0.26  -0.36  -0.29  -0.25  -0.14  -0.21  na 
South Asia
c                       
NRA agric. exportables  na  -37.5  -37.2  -30.0  -36.1  -27.9  -20.6  -15.8  -12.0  -6.2  na 
NRA agric. imp-comp  na  39.2  41.2  39.4  45.1  37.9  63.3  25.1  14.5  26.5  na 
Trade Bias Index  na  -0.55  -0.56  -0.50  -0.56  -0.48  -0.51  -0.33  -0.23  -0.26  na 
China and Southeast Asia
c                       
NRA agric. exportables  na  -55.5  -55.1  -51.8  -50.1  -50.0  -41.0  -20.8  -2.2  0.1  na 
NRA agric. imp-comp  na  -10.3  -8.9  -9.4  -2.6  0.5  15.1  3.3  13.3  12.3  na 
Trade Bias Index  na  -0.50  -0.51  -0.47  -0.49  -0.50  -0.49  -0.23  -0.14  -0.11  na 
Japan, Korea and Taiwan                       
NRA agric. exp  -18.1  5.7  4.3  15.4  10.3  25.1  48.9  57.1  57.0  70.3  na 
NRA agric. imp-comp  35.6  43.3  52.8  54.1  76.6  83.7  124.9  127.4  127.0  134.6  122.6 
Trade Bias Index  -0.40  -0.26  -0.32  -0.25  -0.38  -0.32  -0.34  -0.31  -0.31  -0.27  na 
European transition econs.                       
NRA agric. exportables  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  -3.2  -1.0  -1.0  15.2 
NRA agric. imp-comp  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  32.5  35.4  35.7  32.3 
Trade Bias Index  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  -0.27  -0.27  -0.27  -0.13 
Western Europe                       
NRA agric. exp  9.3  17.4  31.7  22.5  33.3  31.1  50.1  38.0  15.0  8.1  1.7 
NRA agric. imp-comp  59.4  77.2  82.9  55.7  61.7  79.5  87.6  67.2  52.8  50.5  28.9 
Trade Bias Index  -0.31  -0.34  -0.28  -0.21  -0.18  -0.27  -0.20  -0.17  -0.25  -0.28  -0.21 
North America                       
NRA agric. exportables  2.7  2.8  6.1  5.1  2.9  5.4  10.5  6.0  5.4  7.6  4.1 
NRA agric. imp-comp  8.6  9.3  8.8  6.7  10.5  19.7  23.6  18.6  11.3  16.8  11.0 
Trade Bias Index  -0.05  -0.06  -0.02  -0.01  -0.07  -0.11  -0.10  -0.10  -0.05  -0.08  -0.06 
ANZ                       
NRA agric. exportables  3.8  4.7  6.6  5.8  5.5  7.6  6.5  3.6  2.2  0.2  0.2 
NRA agric. imp-comp  7.9  8.3  9.3  11.7  8.7  8.4  6.5  3.8  2.0  2.0  1.5 
Trade Bias Index
   -0.04  -0.03  -0.02  -0.05  -0.03  -0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.02  -0.01 
Developing countries
c 
NRA agric. exportables  na  -46.5  -44.6  -45.4  -43.9  -41.4  -35.8  -18.7  -5.5  -3.0  na 
NRA agric. imp-comp  na  12.7  13.5  7.8  12.8  16.5  37.7  22.6  22.0  23.0  na 
Trade Bias Index
   na  -0.53  -0.51  -0.49  -0.50  -0.50  -0.53  -0.34  -0.23  -0.21  na 
High-income countries  
NRA agric. exportables  4.2  7.4  13.5  10.3  11.3  12.1  22.3  15.9  8.1  6.9  2.9 
NRA agric. imp-comp  31.2  45.9  50.2  36.5  47.4  58.1  71.4  62.4  53.9  50.7  30.8 
Trade Bias Index
   -0.21  -0.26  -0.24  -0.19  -0.24  -0.29  -0.29  -0.29  -0.30  -0.29  -0.21 
World 
c 
NRA agric. exportables  na  -23  -20  -23  -25  -24  -17  -7  -1  0  na 
NRA agric. imp-comp  na  35  37  27  34  38  57  43  38  36  na 
Trade Bias Index   na  -0.43  -0.42  -0.39  -0.44  -0.45  -0.47  -0.35  -0.28  -0.26  na 
Source: Authors’ derivation, using data in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). 
a. NRAs for non-covered products are included here (unlike in Figure 1.3).  
b. Trade Bias Index, TBI = (1+NRAagx/100)/(1+NRAagm/100) – 1, where NRAagx and 
NRAagm are the weighted average percentage NRAs for the exportable and import-
competing parts of the agricultural sector, with weights based on production valued at  
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undistorted prices. TBIs shown here are calculated using the regional 5-year averages of  
NRAagx and NRAagm. 
 
c. Estimates for China pre-1981 and India pre-1965 are based on the assumption that the 
nominal rate of assistance to agriculture in those years was the same as the average NRA 
estimates for those countries for 1981-84 and 1965-69, respectively, and that the gross value 
of production in those missing years is that which gives the same average share of value of 
production in total world production in 1981-84 and 1965-69, respectively. The developing 




Table 6: Deviation of national NRA around its trend value,
a 12 key covered farm products,
b 
developing, high-income and all focus countries, 1965-84 and 1985-2004 
 
(NRA percentage points) 
 
  Developing countries  High-income countries  All focus countries 
   1965-1984  1985-2004  1965-1984  1985-2004  1965-1984  1985-2004 
Grains, oils, sugar             
Rice  32  64  66  229  37  103 
Wheat  33  47  80  91  56  65 
Maize  36  33  53  58  43  41 
Soybean  46  117  75  61  56  94 
Sugar  53  66  179  173  132  116 
Tropical  cash crops             
Cotton  38  33  42  28  35  32 
Coconut  22  20  na  na  22  20 
Coffee  41  27  na  na  41  27 
Livestock products             
Milk  76  69  239  190  200  137 
Beef  45  52  128  127  101  93 
Pigmeat  81  60  92  77  90  62 
Poultry  109  74  164  197  145  134 
 
a Deviation is computed as the absolute value of (residual – trend NRA) where trend NRA in 
each of the two sub-periods is obtained by regressing NRA on time. 
 
b Unweighted average of  national deviations. 
 




Table 7: Coefficient of correlation between regional NRA and international price, 12 key 
covered farm products,
a various regions, 1965 to 2007 
 















Grains, oils, sugar             
             
Rice  -0.19  -0.58  -0.51  -0.52  -0.10  -0.16 
(0.99) 
Wheat  0.01  -0.81  0.09  -0.12  -0.28  -0.41 
(0.85) 
Maize  -0.20  -0.70  -0.55  -0.04  -0.29  -0.57 
(0.71) 
Soybean  -0.15  -0.42  0.16  -0.27  -0.07  -0.18 
(0.30) 
Sugar  -0.57  -0.74  -0.57  -0.40  -0.69  -0.70 
(0.99) 
Tropical cash crops             
             
Cotton  0.28  -0.33  -0.16  -0.29  -0.74  -0.57 
(0.96) 
Coconut  na  -0.16  -0.14  na  na  -0.12 
(0.99) 
Coffee  -0.35  na  0.02  -0.30  na  -0.28 
(0.99) 
Livestock products             
             
Milk  0.19  -0.57  -0.70  0.33  -0.10  -0.31 
(0.98) 
Beef  0.20  na  0.05  0.55  0.29  0.32 
(0.97) 
Pigmeat  na  na  -0.53  -0.47  -0.60  -0.76 
(0.98) 
Poultry  0.59  na  -0.52  -0.78  -0.22  -0.34 
(0.87) 
 
a  Computed using the weighted average regional NRAs and a common international 
reference price for each product, from World Bank (2008).  
 
b Numbers in parantheses are the coefficient of correlation between the unweighted average 
regional NRAs and CTEs for individual covered products. For all covered products the 
coefficient is 0.93.  
 
Source: Authors’ derivation, using data in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). 
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Table 8: Contributions to total agricultural NRA from different policy instruments,
a by region, 1981-84 and 2000–04 
(percent) 
















Import tax equivalent  6  34  18  8  24  14 
Export subsidies  1  2  2  1  1  2 
Export tax equivalent  -20  0  -13  -3  0  -2 
Import subsidy equivalent  -2  0  -2  -1  0  -1 
ALL BORDER MEASURES  -15  36  5  5  25  13 
Domestic measures             
Production subsidies  1  2  1  1  1  1 
Production taxes  -5  0  -3  -1  0  -1 
Net subsidies to farm inputs  1  3  2  2  2  2 
Non-product-specific assistance (except to inputs)  1  1  1  2  5  3 
ALL DOMESTIC PRODUCTION SUPPORTS  -2  6  1  4  8  5 
             
Decoupled payments to farm households  0  6  2  0  11  4 
NRA (including decoupled payments)  -17  48  8  9  44  22 
             
Gross subsidy equivalent, in real 2000 US$ billion  -113  223  99  58  173  250 
             
Agric R&D as % of undistorted gross value of prod’n  0.4  0.8  0.6  0.3  1.0  0.5 
a In the absence of data, we assume the share of input tax/subsidy, domestic production tax/subsidy and border tax/subsidies for non-covered 
farm products is the same as that for covered farm products. The first period begins in 1981 because that was the first year for which estimates 
for China are available. 
b All table entries have been generated by dividing the Gross Subsidy Equivalent of all (including decoupled) measures by the total agricultural 
sector’s gross production valued at undistorted prices.  
Source: Authors’ derivation, using distortion data in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) and agricultural research expenditure data from the 
CGIAR’s Agricultural Science and Technology Indicators website at www.asti.cgiar.org (accessed October 2008).  
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Table 9: Contributions to CTE on covered agricultural products from different policy instruments, by region, 1981-84





























   
Import tax equivalent  10  46  24  10  32  19 
   
Export subsidies  1  2  1  1  1  2 
   
Export tax equivalent  -22  0  -13  -2  0  -2 
   
Import subsidy equivalent  -3  0  -2  -1  0  -1 
   
ALL BORDER MEASURES  -14  48  10  8  33  18 
 
Domestic measures 




   
Consumption subsidies  -1  0  -1  -1  -6  -3 
   
Consumption taxes  0  0  0  1  0  1 
   
ALL DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION MEASURES  -1  0  -1  0  -6  -2 
 
TOTAL CTE (covered farm products only)  -15  48  9  8  27  16 





Consumer tax equivalent, in real 2000 US$ billion  -67  146  73  34  79  125 
 
a This period begins in 1981 because that was the first year for which estimates for China are available. 
 























NRA non-ag  
 
1960-84  2000-04  2000-04 
  Africa  -25.0  -18.0  -17.4  -0.08 
LAC  -30.6  -0.5  -15.0  0.48 
South Asia
b  -47.1  3.4  -42.8  0.91 
SE Asia + China
b  -56.7  1.5  -20.9  0.38 
Japan, Korea, Taiwan   40.7  136.7  124.3  0.13 
Western Europe  46.2  34.9  29.8  -0.46 
North America  3.5  15.5  10.5  0.41 
Australia/New Zealand  -10.6  -1.4  -15.8  1.57 
Developing countries 
(incl Korea and Taiwan
b  -47.3  3.1  -22.5  0.51 
High-income countries  22.4  32.1  25.7  0.66 
 
a The counterfactual RRA is the RRA computed using the 2000-04 NRA for 
agriculture and the 1960-84 NRA for non-agriculture. 
b Regional aggregate includes back-casting, which means estimates for China pre-
1981 and India pre-1965 are based on the assumption that the nominal rate of 
assistance to agriculture in those years was the same as the average NRA estimates for 
those countries for 1981-89 and 1965-74, respectively, and that the gross value of 
production in those missing years is that which gives the same average share of value 
of production in total world production in 1981-89 and 1965-74, respectively. 
 
Source: Authors’ derivation, using distortion data in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008).  
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Table 11: OLS regression results to explain national average agricultural NRAs, all 
focus countries, 1955 to 2007 
 
 
          Log(real GDP per capita)  0.207***  -0.943***  -0.943***  -0.989*** 
 
(0.00535)  (0.0614)  (0.0558)  (0.0682) 
Log(real GDP per capita) sq. 
 
0.0741***  0.0743***  0.0765*** 
   
(0.00395)  (0.00359)  (0.00432) 
Log(Arable land per capita) 
   
-0.204***  -0.211*** 
     
(0.00851)  (0.00931) 
TSI,
a non-farm primary products 
     
0.0508*** 
       
(0.0165) 
Constant  -1.356***  2.875***  2.593***  2.805*** 
 
(0.0422)  (0.229)  (0.208)  (0.260) 
          Observations  2584  2584  2551  2095 
Adjusted R
2  0.366  0.442  0.552  0.540 
Standard errors in parentheses 
        *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
         
a Trade Specialization Index = net exports divided by exports plus imports of non-
farm primary products. 
 
Source: Authors’ derivation, using distortion data in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008).  
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Table 12: OLS regression results to explain national average RRAs, focus countries 












            Log (Real GDP per capita)  -1.847***  -0.481***  -1.634***  -1.871*  -0.713*** 
 
(0.160)  (0.185)  (0.371)  (1.103)  (0.0657) 
Log (Real GDP per capita), sq.  0.157***  0.0448***  0.112***  0.122**  0.0627*** 
 
(0.0114)  (0.0143)  (0.0241)  (0.0580)  (0.00418) 
Log(Arable land per capita)  -0.100***  -0.0170  -0.215***  -0.309***  -0.228*** 
 
(0.0236)  (0.0172)  (0.0180)  (0.0179)  (0.00933) 
Constant  4.894***  0.948  5.463***  6.897  1.382*** 
 
(0.558)  (0.597)  (1.407)  (5.245)  (0.250) 
            Observations  405  619  295  872  2336 
Adjusted R-squared  0.720  0.069  0.329  0.415  0.592 
Standard errors in parentheses 
          *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
           
 
Source: Authors’ derivation, using distortion data in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008).  
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Table 13: Impact of including predicted non-focus NRAs

































  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 
SSAfrica + Egypt
c  92  6  -32  -7  -9 
Asia  98  37  -14  12  11 
Latin America  80  10  -7  5  3 
M. East & N. Africa
d  0  3  11  na  11 













a Predictions are generated using the NRA counterparts to the RRA regressions in 
table 12 above. The aggregate developing country NRA is a weighted average, with 
weights based on shares in column 2 times 100 minus the shares in column 1. 
 
b Weighted averages, using farm production valued at undistorted prices as weights. 
 
c The Sub-Saharan African prediction is based on regression results for all focus 
African countries except South Africa and Egypt. 
 
d The focus countries used for predicting the NRA for the developing countries of the 
MENA region (excl. Egypt) comprises all developing countries including Turkey. The 
MENA countries for which pertinent data are available are Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen. 
 
e Weighted average of columns 3 and 4, with weights based on shares in column 1. 
 
Source: Authors’ derivation, using distortion data in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008).  
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Table 14: Product level regressions, 12 key covered products and all focus countries, 

























Rice  -2.014***  0.156***  -0.392***  -0.727***  5.946***  1281  0.50 
 
(0.154)  (0.0100)  (0.0222)  (0.0453)  (0.570) 
     
Wheat  -0.895***  0.0689***  -0.162***  -0.397***  2.730***  1661  0.33 
 
(0.117)  (0.00735)  (0.0161)  (0.0369)  (0.458) 
     
Maize  -0.419***  0.0325***  -0.166***  -0.194***  1.261***  1525  0.20 
 
(0.0943)  (0.00606)  (0.0146)  (0.0294)  (0.356) 
     
Soybean  0.959***  -0.0425**  -0.548***  -0.127  -5.239***  703  0.31 
 
(0.344)  (0.0212)  (0.0368)  (0.0892)  (1.365) 
     
Sugar  -0.925***  0.0781***  -0.239***  -0.450***  2.833***  1648  0.31 
 
(0.193)  (0.0123)  (0.0277)  (0.0601)  (0.727) 
     
Cotton  -0.358***  0.0314***  0.00620  -0.276***  0.997***  883  0.23 
 
(0.0925)  (0.00625)  (0.0164)  (0.0442)  (0.325) 
     
Milk  -0.879***  0.0844***  -0.356***  -0.401***  1.962  1389  0.32 
 
(0.301)  (0.0184)  (0.0322)  (0.0847)  (1.203) 
     
Beef  -0.763***  0.0667***  -0.280***  -0.317***  1.771**  1426  0.43 
 
(0.205)  (0.0122)  (0.0194)  (0.0467)  (0.849) 
     
Pigmeat  1.406*** 
-
0.0716***  -0.313***  0.190***  -6.754***  1213  0.28 
 
(0.211)  (0.0125)  (0.0186)  (0.0445)  (0.885) 
     
Poultry  -1.693***  0.118***  -0.485***  -0.307***  5.785***  1304  0.29 
   (0.351)  (0.0209)  (0.0301)  (0.0795)  (1.460) 
     
a Observations are included only in years when the product is tradable. The constant 
coefficient refers to importables whereas for exportables the coefficient on the 
exportables dummy needs to be added to that coefficient for the constant.  
 
Source: Authors’ derivation, using distortion data in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). 
 